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"Reform or revolution"? Polanyian versus
Marxian perspectives on the regulation of
the economic
GRIETJE BAARS'
University College London/City University London
Abstract
Rosa Lu embourgs 1900 pamphlet "Reform or revolution, Jwch criiqued rr-ist political strateg,
has relvance to, andfinds choes in today debates on thpossibilty nd desirabiity of using law toerotct
society from the ma rket's negaiv'e elfecs. It a/so summd up the nineteenth-centulry' "Polanyl'anz" reform~ist
anidMarxist "revolultionary" pespetives. Pokm/yi a;rgued that "the eco nmi must be "embedded' ini the
soial by mean of legal regulati, asrgument he illustrates with the help of the "jpeenhamland'
exampe. Marx, wh/e ackniowleagig the roe of the legal struge as part of class strugge, conicldes that
uiltiatehenght can! nev'er be hi/her than tlhe econom)ic strulcture 0f soiety" Maxist legal theonst
Pashuka nis developed this posiionl in his "coimmodity' }orm theory of law" which points to the structuIral
impossibi/li of laws rgulation of capital im. W1hi/e contemporary "Polanyiist" Ruggie againz asserts that
legal anid soft law "lobal governia/nce' regimes cani contrd! capita/ism m 1am //nstrumenit, the corp orati,
Shmrcontra Rug~gie a;rgues that the "m1oalisation/ of miarkets"' throuigh co/porate social respon/sibility
(CSR) leads to the "wiarketsation/ of morality" or~ a change in what we perceive law to be (aid who has
kicatimate auithority to regulae) rather tha~n at"taming" of miarkets. Tollow'ing Shamir, I add that this
corporate-led global governa~nce hastens the collapse 01 capitalismi, anid conf/rms the inev'ita~bility' of
revo/ltion and the suibsequnt creation of a la-re soiety'.
Introduction
I n her 1900 pamphlet "Reform or revolution", Rosa Luxemburg made short shrift of her
contemnporary Eduard Bernstein's reformist th eory in w hich he argues that social-
democrats must abandon the idea ot revolution, and instead work towards. the betterment
ot the situation of the worker, and increased social control ot the economy\ w/thini the
capitalist framework.2 "Bernstein, proposing to change the sea of capitisi't bitterness into
a sea of socialist swveetness, by progressively pouring into it bottles of social reformnist
1 PhD Candidate, U nive~rst Colege London (submission epct ed ID~cemrber 2011); lecturer, Cit U nive~rst
London. I am o gratul to Kamil Mlajchrzak, Ronen Shamir, China Mi~eville, Catherine Redgivell, Stephen
Guest, Sonja Buckel,Joel ShalitJason Bektt and the anmoOus reviewers for their many helpful conments
and sugg estions to Dr Bettina Lange and Dr Dania Thomas for inviin me to paiticipate in the Oxford CSL S
w orkshop and publication. All errors and omissions rmain mmialone
2 Bernstein presented this theory in his series of aticles "Probleme des Sozialismus" in the maga ine Di Nue
Zeit edited and published by Karl Kautsk, 1896 onwxards, and his book Di Voraussequge de Sogal isan
die Augaben der So ialeokratie (Berlin: Dietz erlag~ 1991)
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lemonade, presents an idea that is . . . insipid [and] fantastic" Luxemburg concludes.3
Bernstein's position is closely related to that of Polani. while Luxemburg was a
"wholehearted Marxist".4 In this article, I analyse Polanyian and Marxist perspectives on the
(legal) regulation of "the economic". Bernstein's "lemonade" is legal measures aimed at
constraining market actors so as to mnimise capitalism's negative effects on society. Polanyi
also argues that law is required (and adequate) to subject the market to the needs of society
Here I will argue, with Luxemburg and Marx, that subjecting the market to society through
law is a structural impossibility, and that nothing less than revolution will achieve the ends
envisaged by Polanyians and Marxists alike.
In section two, I examine Polanyi's discussion on the "Speenhamland system": one of
the legal measures to curb the extreme poverty resulting from the creation of the free
market in seventeenth-century England. In Polanvi's The Great Trans/oruation, his discussion
of Speenhamland illustrates his general attitude to legal regulation of the market. In section
three, I set out Marx's discussion of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century legal regulation
of the length of the working day, which in turn illustrates Marx's attitude to the use of law
in a capitahst society. There then follows a discussion of further works by Marx, Engels,
Luxemburg and Pashukanis to complete the Marxian picture on the utility of law in
emancipatory struggle and also post-capita/ism. In section four I demonstrate the debate's
contemporary relevance and analyse a Polanyian take on the regulation of the economy, and
specifically the corporation, as exemplified by John Ruggie in his academic work as well as
his position as UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights. His approach is
critiqued by Shamir - discussed in section five. Finally, in section six, I take a closer look at
the identity of society and the agents of change in each perspective. I return to Rosa
Luxemburg and this article's title "Reform or revolution?" to draw conclusions on
regulation of the economy through law.
Karl Polanyi: The Great Transformation
POLANYI'S SPEENHAMLAND
The main example of "social regulation" in which Polanyi's theoretical argument is
anchored is the Speenhamland system. In Polanvi's idiosyncratic5 account of the transition
to, and maturing of, European capitalism in The Great Transformation, Speenhamland is key:
in Polanyi's view, "few institutions have shaped the fate of a whole civilization more
decisively than this".6
The British Speenhamland system was devised in 1795 as a response to widespread
poverty following the forcible uprooting of the poor from their countryside abodes in the
enclosure regime - a process ongoing since the Tudor period that saw the division of
commons land into private property, with the dual aim of increasing agricultural production
(through e.g. mass sheep-farming instead of self- sufficiency and cottage industry) and the
creation of a class of landless poor who would be employed in the newly developing
3 R Luxemburg, "Reform or revolution" in H Scott (eLd.), Te Esntial Ra Lx emburg or revoluion and te
m strike Chicao Haymarket Books 2008), p. 65.
4 J P N el, Ra Luem brgvol I (London: OUP 1966), p. vii.
5 Polanyi offers unique definitions for commonly used terms such "market" p. 59), "commodity" (p. 75),
"xploitation" (p. 42), the "division of labour" (p. 46), etc. hich s is work apart from Snithian
economists as well as Marxist scholars: K Polaiyi, The Grea Trforaon Theplical and economic oins of our
im 2nd edn (Boston: Beacon Press 2001).
6 Ibid. p. 90.
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industries. Probably the best-known account of this process is E P Thompson's The
faking of the E ngish IW ork/g Class.8
According to Thompson, "[e]nclosure (when all the sophistications are allowed for) was
a plain enough case of class robbery, played according to fair rules of property and law laid
down by a parliament of property-owners and lawyers".9 The historian Merriman
contextualises Speenhamland within a tightening (legal) regime of social control to stem
growing lower-class restiveness and to prevent the influence of the French Revolution of
1798, and later the European revolutions of 1848, from "blowing over" to Britain.1 0 A poor
support system had been available since the early eighteenth century, including the "old"
Elizabethan Poor Law (an indirect response to the cessation of grain imports from France
after British involvement in French wars), which included parishes and townships providing
charity to those wearing a badge with the letter "P" for pauper.I
The Speenhamland system was a different kind of system, with parishes providing top-
up wages to working poor to the level of the price of two loaves of bread per week per
worker.12 It thus tied wages to the price of wheat while the price of wheat (and the
availability of wheat for consumption) fluctuated with the quality of the harvest and market
manipulation by traders stockpiling wheat for future sales. One effect of the system was that
it encouraged employers to pay low wages in the knowledge these would be topped up.13
Eventually, after a report by the Royal Commission of the Poor Law, which accepted the
view that the system interfered with the market, the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834
abolished the systern and replaced it with workhouses, which at their high point in 1841 held
more than 200000 people incarcerated in Britain.14
Polanyi presents the enclosure process (which, he notes, was also called a "revolution of
the rich against the poor")15 as a (non-)choice between "habitation or improvement".16
While he recognises the "avalanche of social dislocation"1  this process brought about, as
well as the "wholesale destruction of the traditional fabric of society",' 8 the improvement
7 Enclosures are also described by (amongst others) M arx - who defines them as an essentil precursor to
capitalism termed "primitive accumulation" - and which we see occurring also in the colonies during the
nineteenth and txentieth centuries, e.g. the Congo as described by Renton and Zeilig, in D Renton, D Seddon
Zeili, Th Coo: Pa a esistan ondon: Zed Books 2006); for enclosure and resistance in the
tventy-first century, e, .g., the work of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra
wwwinst.orgbr/ (last accessed I September 2011).
8 E P Thompson, i /a the Engish Working Class (London: Penguin 1963).
9 Ibid. pp. 237-8.
10 For example, in 1723 the British Parliament passed a law that added 50 capitad offences against property,
including poaching, gathering of firewood, etc., from land that had been the common source of sustenance
before enclosures. The role of, and attitude to, law in the enclosure process is summed up in the folk rhNme
of the time: "They hang the man, and flog the woman, That steals the goose from off the common; But let
the gr villain loose, That steal the common ifrom the gooe." See, generall, J Merriman, A Histop of
odr ,erop: rom Ie renaicacm o h , 3rd edn (New York:\\ \ Norton & Company 2010), pp. 382ff.
11 Ibid. p 383.
12 The Speenhamland s em is named after the parish of Speenhamland in Berkshire, where it was conceived.
Additional wages could be p id for children, and also for clothing, unless such was supplied by the employer
or the parish directly. The s stem was funded through "poor rates", which were property taxes collected from
landowners.
13 Merrirnan, A Hist o, n. 10 above, p. 559; see also, Thompson, The Making, n. 8 above, pp. 247-8.
14 Merriman, I tor n. 10 above, p. 559.
15 Polanyi, Te Ge Tsorm ti. 5 above, p. 37.
16 Ibid. p. 35.
17 Ibid. p. 42.
18 Ibid. p. 81.
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in agricultural yield, including the increased wool production which eventually led to the
development of the cotton industry - the catalyst for Britain's Industrial Revolution - made
it worth the sacrifice.10
Even so. the fulfilment of the capitalist utopia of the free market was prevented. Polanyi
states, "[e]ighteenth-century society unconsciously resisted any attempt at being made into
a mere appendage of the market".2( By the implementation of the Speenhamland systein,
Polanyi argues, societj effectively prevented the establishment of a free market for labour.
However, the main failure of Speenhamland came with the realisation that "nobody would
work for a wage if he could make a living doing nothing".21 In addition. "no labourer had
any financial interest in satisfying his employer, his income being the same whatever wages
he earned".22 Within a few years, the labour of paupers "became indistinguishable from
'boondoggling' or the semblance of work maintained for the sake of appearances".23 'Thus,
it was concluded that a regular labour market had to be established, and "mankind was
forced into the paths of a utopian experiment".24
Elsewhere Polanvi speaks of an emotional awareness of the individual and his or her
role in larger society, "the discovery of society", and the moral or emotional effect of
Speenhamland: "the dehumanization of the masses began to paralyse national life, and
notably to constrain the energies of industry itself ".25 This awareness appealed to the
liberal sensitivity and self-image of the emerging middle class. While the la was considered
"squirearchy's" (landowners') last attempt to prevent the advent of a new order, "[tlhe
abolishment of Speenhamland [in 1832] was the true birthday of the modern working class,
whose immediate self-interest destined them to become protectors of society against the
intrinsic dangers of a machine civilization".
The year 1832 was of course also the year of the Reform Act, which produced far-
reaching electoral reforms including eliminating the so-called "rotten boroughs" and
"pocket boroughs" and effectively giving the middle class a majority in Parliament.26 AS
such, "[t]he repeal of Speenhamland was the work of a new class entering onto the
historical scene, the middle classes of England". Furthermore, in 1832 the English
Industrial Revolution was about to enter its most productive phase. Enterprise and industry,
the traditional realms of the middle classes, were about to increase exponentially, The new
Poor Law Amendment Act "assumed a labouring class which . .. was forced to give its best
under the threat of hunger, so that wages were regulated by the price of gaiin". 2 7 The
niddle-class dependence on the labour of the working class made the working class the
moral protector of bourgeois society, and the legitimiser of its authority.
19 Polanyi, Thet r ans rmatio, n. 5 above, pp. 39-40. Polanyi thus cites agricultural effciency as the sole
purpose of the enclosire system, unlike Merriman, Marx and Thompson.
20 Ibid. p. 81.
21 Ibid. p. 82.
22 Ibid. p. 83.
23 Ibid. p. 83.
24 Ibid. p. 85.
25 Ibid. p. 102.
26 An Act to Amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales, short title: Representation of the
People Act 1832 (2 & 3 Wm I\ c. 45); Merriman, A Iistory, n. 10 above, p. 592.
27 Polanyi, The Great / Trnsoration, n. 5 above, pp. 144-5.
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POLANYI ON "EMBEDDEDNESS"
Law continued to play an important role in "market society" after the English "bourgeois
revolution".28 Polansi discusses the protectionism that enabled British industry to develop,
the centralisation of banking through Peel's Bank Act of 1844 and the creation of an
effective policing system and regime of criminal law needed for social control.29
Aside from the market requiring law, any attempt at disembedding the economic from
society would result in measures taken by society to protect itself Polanyi's concept of
"embeddedness" expresses the idea that the economy cannot (or should not be)30 self
regulating but must be subordinated to politics and social relations.3 1 Polanyi argued that
market society is unsustainable because it is fatalls destructive to the human and natural
contexts it inhabits.3 2 Bs his oft-cited statement "1]aissez faire was planned; planning was
not", Polanvi means that these measures are spontaneous, ad hoc. But despite legislative acts
adopted to manage problems arising out of modern industrial conditions (including, for
example, "public health, factory conditions, municipal trading, social insurance, shipping
subsidies, public utilities, trade associations, and so on"), liberal capitalism was also to fail in
the early twentieth century.33
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL?
In Polanyi's view, the attempt to organise high finance along the model of market liberalism
through the Gold Standard led directly to both World Wars and the Great Depression. 34
Rothschilds and I P Morgan are accredited with a particular role, although thes could be
seen as parv pro toto for the undoubtedlI much larger sector. The failure included not dealing
adequately with the in;er atinIa! aspect of high finance:
The Rothschilds were subject to no one government; as a family they embodied
the abstract principle of internationalism; their lovalty was to a firm, the credit of
which had become the only supranational link between political government and
industrial effort in a swiftly growing world economy.3 5
Writing during the Second World War (The Great Transjr#niaion was published in 1944),
Polanyi argued that what is needed for a sustainable market-based system is that labour. land
and money be "taken out of the market" and regulated by the state. Crucially, he does not
give further details of what such regulation might entail - leading to the conclusion that
social regulation must remain spontaneous, and reflect the liberal values inhering in society
at a given point. Since Polanyi's thesis is that state regulation of the "economic" is required
and desirable, the fact that he anchors his thesis in two main examples of failed regulation
may seem odd. However, both examples were defective in Polanyi's mind in that their aim
had not been to protect "the social", but partica interests: the interests of the squirearch
in the first example, and US interests in the second. Below I argue that Polanyi's conception
of "the social" also reflects a particular section of society, namely the middle class, but first
I examine the working class in relation to regulation of the economic.
28 Polanyi, The Grea Tran.formaion, rn. 5 above, p. 145.
29 To this should be added, that "capitalism's main bearer" or "engine" is of course also a creature of law.
30 Polanvi wsavers beneen arguing that the economy cannot, and should not, be separated from society, which
has given rise to arguments oer the correct interpretation of his work: F Block, "Introduction" in Polanyi,
The Great Tianomaion, n. 5 above, p. xxis
31 Block, "Introduction", n. 30 abov , p. xxvi.
32 Polanyi, The Great Tranro, n. 5 above, p. 3.
33 Ibid. p. 153.
34 Generly, ibid. pp. 11-32.
35 Ibid. pp. 11-12.
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Karl Marx and Marxist approaches to the regulation of "the economic"
MARX ON THE LENGTH OF THE WORKING DAY
Marx said. unless society forces capital, it will not improve the conditions of labour. Any
change in the appalling labour conditions pertaining in the British factories of the time -
which included children as young as seven working 16-hour days - like change in general,
is achieved through class struggle.36 In Chapter 24 of Capital vol. I, Marx analyses the
eighteenth and nineteenth-century legal regulation of the length of the working day, which
reflects His assessment of the role of law in capitalist society.37
Marx relates how "centuries of 'civil war' between capital and labour" have led to
concessions made by capital in favour of workers. At times this has occurred because of
labour shortage.38 Once a concession is made and "enacted" in legislation, another struggle
ensues over enforcement,39 where the capitalist may insist on enforcement in order to avoid
competition from "false brethren" - the insistence on a "level playing field". 4 0
At other times the capitalist class would agree to compromise in return for a concession
on another issue before Parliament. Capital found various ways to compensate for these
concessions with economic violence, for example, through responding to a legal limit on
the working day (the Ten Hour Act) with a reduction in wages - such that workers would
then advocate the repeal of the law that had been passed in their favour.4 1
Enforcement increasingly became a battle between factory inspectors and magistrates.
Marx describes one example where the magistrates rule on a particular alleged violation
brought by a tactory inspector - the magistrates themselves being, like the defendants,
powerful cotton- spinners.4 2 Dependence on the factory inspectors for enforcement also
meant the workers had no direct access to legal mechanisms of redress. As Marx put it,
"[tlhe isolated worker succumbs" 43 _ for this reason, Marx concludes:
For "protection" against "the serpent of their agonies" the labourers have to put
their heads together, and, as a class compel the passing of a law, an all-powerful
social barrier that shall prevent the very\ workers fron selling, by voluntary
contract with capital, themselves and their families, into slavery and death. In
place of the pompous catalogue of the "inalienable rights of men" comes the
modest Magna Carta of a legally limited working-day, which shall make clear
"when the time which the worker sells is ended, and when his own begins".44
This gives the superficial impression that Marx has substantial faith in law's
emancipatory potential. From Marx's other writing we learn that this was not the case, and
that his call for "an all-powerful social barrier" should be understood rhetorically. As Marx
was eminently aware, and as Chris Arthur has surmised:
36 K Marx and F Fngels, Mamesto oM th Communis Pa (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1977), p 40.
37 K Marx, Caita A ct of ial e Vol. I (London: Penguin 1976).
38 Ibid. p. 383.
39 Ibid. p. 392.
40 Ibid. p. 393.
41 Ibid. pp. 396-7.
42 Ibid. p. 401.
43 Ibid. p. 412.
44 Ibid. p. 416. The "modest Magna Carta" may refer to the efforts of the Chartist movement, the mass petition
movement for universal suffrage, which, at the moment when other European countries were enacting their
revolutions, was forcefully repressed in Britain. Merriman, A History, n. 10 above, p. 642.
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No amount of reformist factory legislation can overcome the basic
presupposition of the law: that a property freely alienated belongs to the
purchaser, and hence that the living labour of the worker becomes, through
exchange, available for exploitation by capital. 45
MARXISM AND THE DEBATE ON "LAW'S EMANCIPATORY POTENTIAL"
As indicated above, Marxists are divided on the "emancipatory potential" of law or. more
generally, on the utility of law in class struggle or for the purpose of social regulation Marx
and Engels themselves did not provide an explicit theorisation of the role of law in society,
although they include analyses in various texts.4 6
Some Marxists take a purely "functionalist" view of law, where law is conceived as the
direct embodiment of the interests of the ruling class, 4 7 while others followi Pashukanis in
his view that not merely the content, but also the form of law is inherently capitalist.4 8
Marxist legal theorists such as Pashukanis and Stuchka date the origin of "bourgeois law"
exactly to "primitive accumulation" (M'xlarx's term for the private appropriation of commons
land in the enclosure period occurring throughout Europe)j9 and the capitalist mode of
production: the time when man comes to be seen as a legal person, the bearer of rights,
who can engage in market transactions with other subjects as a formal legal equal.
Pashukanis approximates the legal form to the commodity fortn.t
Mieville summarises the "commodity-form theory of lawi" as follows: "Law is a relation
between subjects abstracted of social context, facing each other in a relationship predicated
on private property, dependent on coercion."si Coercion and violence are inherent in the
legal form as the notion of "mine" necessary to ownership and commodity exchange is only
meaningful inasmuch as it is "mine-not-yours".52 Capitalist law was "universalised" in the
transition to capitalism: the rise to dominance of the bourgeoisie and the demise of the
feudal system. 53 The rise of capitalism in Europe generally coincided with the advent of
parliamentary democracy, through which - after the 1832 Reform Act - the bourgeoisie
eventually gained political as well as economic control. The bourgeois state is described by
45 C Arthur, "Introduction" in F B Pashukanis (ed.), fTa a a : nr try ist edn (translation of 2nd
edn published in 1926) (London: Ink Links 1978), p. 31.
46 Cain and Hunt provide a useful compendium of texts in which larx and Engels deal xith law: M Cain and
A Hunt, Marx and Engeir on Tv (London: Academic Press 1979).
47 Ibid. pp. x-xi.
48 Pashukanis T a nd Marxim, n. 45 above; C Mieville, Beaven Equal Rhs: IMaxist theor o iternai
(London: Pluto 2006); R Knox, "Marxism, internation law and pohticad strategy" (2009) 22 Jeide jnal of
loternational fa_ 413.
49 larx, Caia, n. 37 above, "Part eight: so-called primitive accunlation", pp. 873ff
50 The latter point became the main difference between Pashukanis and Stuchka, who accuses Pashukanis of
"economism" and holds that not all law is necessarily bourgeois lax but law is "class law" based on the xill
of the dominant class, and there is thus a possibility for proletarian law. P Stuchka, "State and law in the period
of socialist construction in R Sharlet, P Maggs and P Byrne (eds Sece i tns on Siet T and Marxirt
(Armonk: MR Sharpe 1988), pp. 180-1. Pashukanis later (pragi matically or otherwise) came around to the
nec sity of law in the Soviet Union but eventuallN becamea victim of one of Stalin's purges.
51 Miville here speaks about internatiomd lax but the analog, applies to domestic law (any law) also. Mieville,
Bea een qt ti/s, n. 48 above, p. 318. On the salience of a distinction between national and international
laxw from a Marxist perspective (and taldng a different view from Mieville), see A Rasulo "The nameless
rapture of the strug gle: towards a Marxist class-theoretic approach to international law" (2008) 19 Finnish
Har / of Ii L a, 2 4 3 , p. 259.
52 Mievile, ea coil I'hi n 48 aboxe p 95 at n.99.
53 For i or- eliborate discussion of this process, see G Baars, Lai Congalg Capial: On Ine (ao ribily of
res/tan i buinessin conflict /hrouh ina!ional ciia law', PhD thesis expected submission December 2011,
U nivrsity College London.
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Marxists as a "committee for managing the affairs of the middle class"54 and an "ideological
smokescreen to conceal [ruling class] hegemony"
Legal struggle as class struggle
In the examples given by Marx in his chapter on the working day, the workers' struggle was
a matter of survival - this is also acknowledged by Polanyi above - as according to the
theory of surplus value the capitalist will seek to increase his profit by maximising
"exploitation", that is, the extraction of surplus value from the worker through keeping
her/him in work for the longest time possible at the lowest possible wage. While the
"physical" limit on the working day lIay at around 18 hours for adults. any further reduction
was achieved through class struggle. Workers withheld their labour, resisted by means of
strikes when the balance of collective bargaining was in their favour.
At other times power was not in their favour, as in the Ten Hour Act example above. A
legislative Act in itself is also but one step, when enforcement of the legal provisions, or
their avoidance, or amendment form new sites for struggle.
Class struggle through law has defined limits. According to Luxemburg:
Trade unions cannot suppress the la\w of wages. Under the most favourable
circumstances the best they can do is to impose on capitalist exploitation the
'normal' limit of the moment. They have not, however, the power to suppress
exploitation itself, not even graduallxa 6
At the same time, law is used both to predict (or, makepredictable) and contain class struggle:
The juridical axiomatic ... allows political forecasting on the part of the dominant
classes: while it expresses a class relationship of forces, it also serves as a prop for
strategic calculation by including among the variables of its systen ie resistance
and struggle of the dominated class.57
Rosa Luxetnburg's critique of Bernstein's programme is that he sees reform, including
legal reform, as an end rather than a mere tactic. Like Polanyi, Bernstein believes a state ot
"freedom" can be achieved through reformist legal regulation and control, such that a
revolution becomes redundant. Luxemburg's argument that this is not possible reflects
Marx's "Critique of the Gotha programme"5 8 and Engels' and Kautsky's critique of
"juridical socialism" which are themselves critical commentaries on "reformist" political
programmes. 9 In short, law'sjorm precludes its emancipatory potential.
Pragmatism, tactics and realism
Some Marxist legal scholars argue for "principled opportunism", i.e. the use of law/legal
struggle tactically when a window of opportunity opens.6 0 Thus, legal struggle and social
regulation can improve the circumstances of the workers and others in the short term or
on an individual basis. Again, it can only do so within the parameters set by the current
54 Marx and Engel Af asto, n. 36 above, p. 44.
55 Pashukanis, na r im, n. 45 above, p. 140. For more recent analyses, see, e.g, N Poulanit asSae, Power,
Socialism (London: Verso 1978).
56 Luxemburg, "Reform or revolution", n. 3 above, p. 56.
57 Poulanit as,,tate, Po; ci Soa, n. 55 above, p. 92.
58 K Marx, "Critique of the Gotha programme" in D McLellan (ed.), Karl Afa, Selected Wr4t itings, 2nd edn
(Oxford: OUP 2000), pp. 610-16.
59 F Engels and K Kautsky, "Juridical socialism" (1977) 7 Politic and Society 203; and see also, P Beirne,
"Introduction" 977) 7 Poir and Socie y 199.
60 Knox, "Marxism, international law and political strategy", n. 48 above, p. 433.
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mode of production, and as such it will amount to "attacking the twigs of the tree" 61 or
"tinkering on the surface". 62 Such opportunism may indeed also serve to egitimate the
current system, form a "pressure valve" for capitalism and thus be undesirable on strategic
grounds, if a move away from the current system is indeed the aim.
Ultimately, what such a move necessitates is abandoning our '",urstisce Weltanschauanf'
("juridical world view"), including liberal conceptions of right and justice which are
generated by the capitalist mode of production.63 Weighing against this perspective is the
consideration that the legal struggle may function as a site for the development of class
consciousness and practice in social organisation (unions as a precursor to socialism,
cooperative worker-owned factories as simulations for the post-capitalist age, etc.). 64
Conversely. for lawyers and professional politcians, the concealment of economic fiacts
(material eality, material inequality) by juridical discourse (discourse structured and
contained by law) may prevent a coherent overall understanding of society.65
The debate among Marxists is far from being resolved, but is to some extent academic
in both senses of the word. 66 While there is often a pragmatic need to use law defensively6 7
(and one could include survival /hardship struggles such as those over the length of the
working das) in this, the range of possible outcomes of a juridical struggle is ab/ays
deternined by the parameters set by the capitalist legal system and the underlying power
relations.68 and always forms onl a part of a broader struggle. As per Marx, "Right can
never be higher than the economic structure of society and the cultural development
conditioned by it."6 9
So, while Polanyi expresses the hope or expectation that society would legislate to protect
against the worst excesses of the market, Marxists point toward the structural limitations on
what can be achieved through law, being essentially a creation, and sine qua non of capitalism.
Ruggie and Shamir in turn show us that this dilemma is still very relevant today.
John Gerard Ruggie: bringing Polanyl into the twenty-first century
"EMBEDDED LIBERALISM"
In a 1982 article in Internationl Organigaion - which has since become "one of the most
frequently cited sources in the study of international political economy"70 - John Gerard
61 Luxemburg, "Reform or revolution", ix. 3 above, p. 82.
62 Mieville, Bwe Eqal Rither, n. 48 above, p. 316.
63 Beirne, "Introduction", n. 59 above. Beirne describes this dominant bourgeois world view as "the
secularisation of theology", p. 204).
64 See, generally, R Luxemburg, "Mass strike" in Scott (ed.), i. 3 above, pp. I 11-81.
65 Beirne "Introduction", n. 59 above, p. 212 and at n. 206.
66 For an overview of different larxist scholars' attitudes to law over the past four decades, see, P Ireland,
"History, critical legal studies and the mysterious disappearance of capitilism" (2002) 65 Modern Law' Review
120.
67 Elena Loizidou describes the dilemma, and its resolution through "parrhesia" of an anarchist in tcurt, in her
analysis of Emma Goldman's trial: F ILoizidou, "Anarchism: this is what democracy looks hik " (draft chapter,
Oni file with author) in J Ma rtel and J Casas Kausen (eds), How Not to Be Go'erned Re ad ieraions
rom a critical anart 1 Lanham: Lexington 2011).
68 Seel dso, S iarks, "Fdse contingenc," (2009) 62 Cut -al Problems 1.
69 Marx, "Critique of the Gotha programme" n. 58 aoe p. 615.
70 J G Ruggie, "Introduction" in J G Ruggie (ed.), E eddg o/ bal M'arke: An edi chall!gge (L ondon:
Ashgate 2008), p. 1.
424 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 62(4)
Ruggie introduces the term "embedded liberalism".71 Ruggie (an international relations
scholar attached to the Harvard Kennedy School of Government)72 by coining this term
engendered a "Polanyi-revival" in the social sciences: inspiring many dozens of attempts to
update Polanyi's insights for the late twentieth and earl) twenty-first centuries.73 Ruggie's
"social constructivist" approach to the regulation of the economy also lies at the basis of
the CSR regime which has developed in the past two decades and to which Ruggie
contributed significantly in his function as the UN Special Representative on Business and
Human Rights. The 1982 article was updated between 2002 and 2008, in particular to
include the "corporate connection".74
Ruggie uses "embedded liberalism" to describe the post-Second World Ward liberalism
which in his view was different from the liberal capitalism that had gone before (and which,
he agrees with Polanyi, had led to both World Wars and the Great Depression).7 The
"embedded liberalism compromise" meant that "unlike the economic nationalism of the
thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the Gold Standard and
free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated on domestic interventionism.76 The
multilateral order that was developed after the Second World War gained acceptance as a
result of
the extraordinary power and perseverance of the United States. But that
multilateralism and the quest for domestic stability were coupled and even
conditioned by one another reflected the shared legitimacy of a set of social
obiectives to which the industrial world had moved77
Notabl, Ruggie did not take up or discuss Polanyi's proposal to "take labour, land and
money out of the market".76
EMBEDDED LIBERALISM 2.0: THE CORPORATE CONNECTION
Between 2002 and 2008 Ruggie developed an updated analysis of the state of "embedded
liberalism" and introduced the "corporate connection". In the intervening 20-odd years,
which saw "a new wave of globalisation broader and deeper than before".9 a "global
backlash" had occurred, not only against the multilateral financial institutions in arnongst
others the "Battle of Seattle", 80 but also against "capitalism's main bearer" the corporation.
As in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the corporation becomes a major site for
contestation, or indeed struggle. One of the causes of the backlash, aside from growing
71 J G Ruggie, "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic
order" (1982) 36(Spring) IntenationalR imes 379.
72 A survey in Foreign Policy magazine identified Ruggie as one of the 25 most influential international relations
scholars in the United States and Canada: J Ruggie's biography on the Harvard University website:
uMMb.hks.harvard edu/m-rcbg/johnruggie/bio.html (last accessed 9 May 2011).
73 Viz. other articles in this special edition.
74 J G Ruggie, "Taking embedded liberalism global: the corporate connection", Ralph Milliband Lecture,
London School of Economics, 6 June 2002. The text of this lecture was published in a slightly longer form
with the same title in Ruggie -ta'g Gotba/arkets, n. 70 above.
75 Ruggie, "International regimes", n. -1 above, p. 392.
76 Ibid. p. 393.
77 Ibid. p. 398.
78 Ruggie, "Introduction", n. 70 above, p. 2.
79 Ibid. p. 4.
80 Ibid. p. 5. See further, generally, N Hertz, The Silent Tak r G al capialsm an h de of demora (1London:
Arrow 2002); R Broad (ed.), Global Backlash: Cit' itati or a jt 6d ecoo (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers 2002).
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global wealth disparities, Ruggie asserts, is the "global imbalance in rule-making".81 What
he means by this is the fact that
[flhose rules that favor global market expansion have become more robust and
enforceable in the last decade or two . . . [while] rules intended to pronote
equally valid social objectives, be they labor standards, human rights,
environmental quality or poverty reduction, lag behind and in some instances
actually have become weaker. 82
In Ruggie's scheme, in order to attain a "socially sustainable globalisation", therefore,
(and to avoid the backlash of the "isms": protectionism, nationalism, terrorism),8 3 an
"embedded legalism" must be generated: "a complex and evolving compromise between
legalism and pragmatism, between rule- and power-based approaches".8 4 As the
"corporation is key to the embedded liberal compronise", it makes sense that this
enterprise lays its focus here.
RUGGIE AS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CORPORATE
CONNECTION REALISED
In 2005, Kofi Annan appointed John Ruggie to the position of Special Representative of
the Secretary General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises.8 6 Ruggie held many consultations with., and received thousands of
submissions by, non-governmental organisations ('NGOs), business leaders., elected
representatives and academic experts of various disciplines.6
Ruggie's 2008 report, "Protect, Respect, and Remedy" which resulted from this process,
rests on three pillars: the state dut to protect against human rights abuses by third parties,
including business; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights (which in essence
means to act with due diligence to avoid infringing the rights of others); and greater access
by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial."8 The Human Rights Council
(HRC) unanimously welcomed the framework and renewed Ruggie's mandate for three
yearsd 9
After "promoting and operationalizing" the framework, in 2011 Ruggie published the
"Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
'Protect, Respect and Remedy' Framework"9 t and has since published reports detailing
81 Ruggie, "Taking embedded liberalism global" in E e i r GClob akets, n. 70 above, pp. 233-4.
82 Ibid. p. 234.
83 K Annan, A Compact for the New Cent.r, 31 January 1999 (UN Doc. SG/SM/6881) cited in Ruggie,
"Introduction", n. 78 above, p. 5.
84 For this notion, see A Lang, "Reconstructing embedded liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and constructivist
approaches to the study of the international trade regime" in Lmbeding Globalfarkets, n. 70 above, p. 24.
85 Ruggie, "Taking embedded liberalism global", n. 81 above, p. 253.
86 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2005/69, 20 April 2005 (UN Doc. H/CN4/RFS/2005/69).
87 Lists can be found on the Human Rights Council website: www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
TransnationalCorporation sPages/SRSGTran sCorpIndex.aspx (last accessed 3 September 2011).
88 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Fnterprises, John Ruggie, 7 April 2008 (UN Doc.
A/HRC/8/5).
89 Report of the Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on rconomic, Social
and Cultural Rights on its Fifth Session, 18 June 2008 (UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/7).
90 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnationl Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 21 Tlarch 2011 (UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31).
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applications of the framework by various parties'91 The HRC unanimously adopted the
guidelines in une 2011.92
Elsewhere I have contrasted the "respect, protect and remedy" framework with
instances of corporate accountability from practice - including most notably the
Nuremberg Trials of the industrialists after the Second World War.9 3 Considering that the
US military tribunals at Nuremberg based their judgments on binding international law
norms, Ruggie's substantively weaker. non-binding framework effectively morphs law into a
(privatised) governance regime9 4 while remaining "bourgeois law" in Pashukanis' sense). A
main part of the "Ruggie effect" is the shifting of our gaze from the individual
businessperson to the abstract corporate entity, which is nevertheless constituted by the
Ruggie franework as an aspiring liberal citizen.9 ,
In addition, the framework's "guidelines for implementation" defer normative
responsibility to a future moment at which the state may never arrive, while creating a chasm
between those affected by corporate activity (and omission) and the locus of the remedy.
Affected persons become dependent on (Western) cause lawyers, who (at best) transform
their grievance into a negotiable claim for monetary compensation. Primitive accumulation
(or, in David Harvey's term, accumulation by dispossession) 96 and slave labour thus become
quantifiable in terms of value and negotiable as between formwal legal equals: the affected
individual versus the Western multinational corporation.9 7
Despite Ruggie's own assessment of the failure of embedded liberalism highlighting the
global imbalance of rule-making, his newly minted regime suffers from the same pathology.
As such, it is unlikely to preserve or reinvigorate embedded liberalism. Instead, it tends
more toward neoliberalism as described by David Harvev:
in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong
property rights, free markets and free trade.)8
Harvey additionally asserts that "neoliberalism values market exchange as -an ethic in
itself. capable of acting as a guide to all human action, and substituting for all previously held
ethical beliefs"'. 9 9 As such the "neo" in neoliberalism only refers to its temporal occurrence,
and not to a ne< liberalism as such. Neoliberalism in Harvev's definition to all intents and
purposes equals the liberal capitalism or market liberalism of the nineteenth century.
91 wx.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/applications0of-frtmewvork-2-may-2011.pdf (las
accessed 03.09.2011).
92 Resolution: Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 16 June 2011
KUN Doc. AHRC/RES/17/4).
93 Baars, Law Congealing Caitsa i, n. 53 above.
94 See also, G Baars, "International law and the encoding of empire's privatisation", Critical Approaches to
International Law Conference "The Force of International Law", Birkbeck College, London, 15-17 MAI
2006; and see, e. M Koskenniemi, "The fate of public international law: between technique and politics"
(2007) 70(January) Moder Law Review 1.
95 On this notion, see also G Mundlak, "Industrial citizenship, social citizenship, corporate citizenship: I just
want my wages" (2007) 8 heorical lnuiries in Law 719, p. 745.
96 D Harvey, Te New Impeal (Oxford: OUP 2003), pp. 137ff.
97 Baars, LaCei r C pia n. 53 above.
98 D Harvey A Brif so of Neoieal (Oxford: OUP 2005). See also A Ong, Neoliberali m as Excepion
uaions in e a oe (Durham: Duke UP 2006).
99 Harvey, A Bi Ho n. 96 above, p. 3 .
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What is "new" about neoliberalism is the vy fact that it has come after a failed embedded
liberalism. This aspect should not be underestimated, in particular for its ideological
significance. T1 It allows an "end of history" discourse as well as the assertion that "there
is no alternative". 101 A key element of neoliberalism (and indeed liberalism in general)102 is
consent by the gov'erned103 In his 1982 article, Ruggie looked at "how power and legitimate
social purpose become fused to project political authority into the international system".104
Likewise, Ruggie's business and human rights project is seeking to rehabilitate the
multinational corporations, after the backlash, by instilling them with a legitimate social
purpose (CSR) while at the sam-e time allowing them (or rather, individual businesspeople
through them) to exert authority on the global level. One wax this authority is achieved is
through (incrementally) fundamentally changing the way lawyers view law (which may have
been partly the reason that Ruggie, an international relations scholar, was appointed as an
expert on a human rights issue) - asserting that on the international level, we have "no
international government" but instead "governance" which is a "dynamic interplax between
civil society, business and the public sector". 105
This aspect in particular is picked up by Ronen Shamir in his analyses of the CSR field.
Another is that of the "market-embedded morality"
Ronen Shamir: towards a market-embedded morality? A critique of corporate
social responsibility
In a series of articles and book chapters, Ronen Shamir critiques the field of CSR.1 ' 6 CSR,
according to Shamir, is the corporate response to the global backlash also mentioned by
Ruggie, but with a particular dimension that makes it relevant to this discussion. Shamir
asserts that the CSR regime was designed in particular to ward off legal activism from those
seeking corporate accountability through either accountability lawsuits (e.g. through the US
Alien Tort Claims Act) or the production of blueprints for the legal regulation of corporate
responsibility.107 This phenomenon itself shows a remarkable inversion, where law
becomes the "sword" of choice for members of civil society who until recently mainly used
law as a "shield", while the elite used law to constitute. entrench and protect its interests. It
100 In the seemingly endless cycle of liberalisms, it is now being suggested that "neoliberalism's failures" can be
met with a "counter-hegemonic globaliation", defined as a "globally organized project of transformation
aimed at replacing the dominant (hegemonic) regime with one that mxim iss dernocratic political control and
makes the equitable development of human capabilities and environ iental statements its priorities": P Fans,
"Is an adternative globihzation possible?" (2008) 36(June) Po an Societ' 271.
101 As used by Frances Fukuyama in The End f Hiiory and T ast Ma \ YNew York: Free Press 1992), and British
Prime Mlinister David Cameron, respectively: "David Cameron: cuts won't be easy but there is no alternative",
Th Guarin, 6 October 2010 (repoirtig on the 2010 Conser ave Party Conference).
102 Pre-liberd c apitalist orders relied pre-eminently on coercion, while fiber d orders to some extent are able to
replace coercion with consent by "manufacturing consent" (N Chomsky, Mfanuaturing Consent: The po.lical
econoy of the mass media (London: Vintage Books 2006) and creating "docile bodies" (M Foucault, Disci line
and Punish: The bir of h & prion (London: Vintage Books 1995).
103 Harv ),A Bief -listory, n. 98 above, pp. 39ff.
104 Ruggie, "International regimes", n. 71 above, p. 382.
105 Rugie, "Taking embedded liberalism global", n. 81 above, p. 232.
106 R Shamir, "Corporate social responsibility: a case of hegemonyand counter-hegemony" in B De Sousa Santos
and C RdrigYuez-Garavito (eds), Ta; and Globaliaion fro; Ieloi: To)ward a cosmopolan galay (Cambridge: CUP
2005), pp. 94, 531-53; "Corporate soci.d responsibility: towards a new market-embedded morality?" (2008) 9
Ti hecaln , [ i T 32; "Between self reg ulation and the alien tort claims act: on the contested concept
of corpte social reponsibilitx (2004) 38 L, andSociety Review 635; "Capitaihsm, governance and authority:
the case of corporate social responsibility" (2 0 10 ) 6 Annual Reie of [r aSociaScince, pp. 531-53.
107 Shamir, "BtLeen self-regulation", n. 106 above, p. 636.
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is therefore not surprising that the corporate response is to break the "sword" by insisting
on a notion of CSR as an "essentially voluntary and non-enforceable issue".108
The strategic move by businesspeople in this "field of contention" has been "to become
actively involved in various displays of corporate responsibility". 109 The effect has been the
privatisation of regulatory structures - with businesspeople being able to define (and
diffuse) the limits of their own responsibility through layering onto the legal corporation
construct various voluntary guidelines, ahile looking good doing it. Having set the parameters,
a trend toward the legalisationl10 of CSR forms no threat to the businessperson - on the
contrary, concealed from view she or he can now use the lower standard cong ealing iito law
to "level the playing field" with competitors and activists alike. As in the example of the
struggle over the working day, resistance is domesticated by legal compromise. And, as in
the working day example, enforcement necessitates a whole new struggle, involving
representation, middlemen and women, institutional and systemic constraints.
Shamir asserts that "an intense interest in ethics and morality has mushroomed
alongside the triumphant ascendance of market rationality as a general principle for
conducting social relations". At the same time, "[a]uthority itself is being privatized,
transforming rules in general and public policies in particular into commodities that are
produced, distributed, and consumed by a host of agencies, enterprises, and non-profit
organizations". 112 Rather than a re-embedding of the market in society, Shamir finds:
[T]he discourse and practice of business and morality is a product of the neo-
liberal project of dissolving the epistemological distinction between market and
society. The greater the drive to embed society in the market, the more socio-
moral questions ... become reframed from within the market. 113
This (false) synthesis between economy and morality "further consolidates, rather than
undermines, the neo-liberal social order".114
How did this situation come to be? Shamir argues that the collapse of welfare-state
liberalism brought into being a neoliberal order governed through a "market of
authorities", where the state is no longer the sole or main site for the production of
legitimacy, where law becomes a "shared problem-solving process" and instruments such as
guidelines and standards replace much hard law 1 5 Neoliberal responsibilisation is directed
at individuals and at institutions including corporations and is based on the model of a
rational actor who assesses costs and benefits of his or her actions: who., in other words.
makes moral decisions on the basis of the logic of the market. 116
Assessed from a Marxist perspective, this situation is not new The "cash nexus" that
pervades all relationships including basic human relationships in capitalism means
cost/benefit or value calculations are made when deciding upon particular (trans)actions.
What is new about neoliberalism viewed from a Marxist perspective is that the "relative
autonomy" that was accorded to the state (whether or not this autonomy was real or merely
108 Shamir, "Between self-regulation", n. 106 above, p. 636.
109 Ibid. p. 644.
110 In the sense of codification and adoption in formal legal instruments such as a potential future "CSR treaty"
As noted above, I include CSR and similar norms produced through global governance in "bourgeois law," in
Pashulkanis' sense.
111 Shamir, "Corporate social responsibliy", n. 106 above, p. 372.
112 Ibid. p. 372.
113 Ibid. p. 373.
114 Ibid. p. 374.
115 Ibid. pp. 378-9.
116 Ibid. p. 380.
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ideological) 11 is now in the process of disappearing While before, states may have
produced class law, now, class law is produced directly by the capitalist class without the
mediation of the state.
Moreover, the effect of responsibilisation is that we perceive this state of affairs as
legitimate. Consciously or otherwise, the discourse of those making moral claims of market
actors (NGOs, cause lawyers, activists) forms a constitutive element of the structure it is
seeking to subvert.1 1 8 On top of this:
[o]nce all players involved, namely national governments, global institutions,
corporations, and civil society organizations, share the private regulation
approach within the broader governance matrix, a whole new set of questions
arises concerning the conditions for the perception, articulation and creation of
socio-moral sensibilities and their translation into concrete political action.1 1 9
Henceforth, "welfare-governance" is articulated according to the logic of the market
and "de facto -cancel[s]' any notion of contestation between social interests and economic
imperatives".12 0 Moral considerations lose their transcendental value and re-emerge as
business opportunities. 12 1
Shamir highlights the "adaptability" of capitalism that Rosa Luxemburg analysed in
"Reform or revolution".122 Moreover. Shamir demonstrates there is no in-between,
between the market and "post-capitalism". What we view as "embedded liberalism" is in
fact "market-embedded morality" or neoliberalism, which is classical liberal capitalism.
Governance: society, class, or global domain?
One main weakness of Polanyi's theory is precisely this lack of a clear separation between
the "sein" and the "sollen": the "is" and the "ought".123 The idea that a self-regulating market
("market society") cannot exist rests on the assumption that "society" can and will prevent
this, based on a sense that the destruction brought about by market society is wrong,
undesirable. Likewise Marx's concept of class struggle relies on the idea that the worker/the
working class know (and jeel themselves to be exploited and in due course gain class
consciousness and seek to come out from under the yoke of capitalism through revolution.
Both are rather significant assumptions to make but empirical reality points towards a
greater likelihood of the (vastly larger) exploited class struggling to better their situation,
than it does to "society as a whole" seeking to remedy the negative effects of the market
when, for some, the positive effects clearlI outweigh the negative.
117 On this notion, see L AIthusser, "Contradiction and overdeternination" in F Maspero (ed.), B Brewster
(trans.), For Man (New York: Random House 1969), pp. 87-128.
118 Shamir, "Corporate social responsibility", n. 106 above, p. 388.
119 Ibid. p. 389. On the notion 01 governance and related points in more detail, see also Shamir, "Capitalism,
governance and authority", n. 106 above.
120 Shamir, "Corporate social responsibility", n. 106 above, p. 389.
121 Ibid. p. 394.
122 Rosa Luxemburg argues that those measures of capitalist "adaptation" cited by Bernstein, e.g., the
development of a credit system, in fact confrm Marx's theory of crisis because such adaptations flow out of,
and in fact exacerbate, capitalism's inner contradictions and move capitalism towards its in eitable collapse
(Luxemburg, "Reform orrevolution",n. 3 above, pp. 47-55). See also, Marx and Engels Manesto, n. 36 above,
pp. 45ff, 60.
123 1 use this not in the strict Kelsenian legal sense but in the general sense of the conflation of fact and norm,
or, perhaps in this case more accurately, the jact and the wish or mora sen timent.
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Polanyi is by no means unaware of class, making trequent reterence to "the common
people" and their character, and role in society.1 2 4 As Polanyi sees "society" rising up to
protect itself., what does he mean by "society". or, what (section of society would have been
"springing up" in the particular historical conjunctures described by Polanvi? At the time of
Speenhamland this was the squirearchy, though after the Reform Act and the completion of
the transition to capitalism, the society that was "discovered" was the bourgeoisie.
In line with Marxism's internationalism, the notion of global classes has recently been
elaborated in legal scholarship by among others B S Chimni: "the 'transnational capitalist
class' (TCC) operates in the transnational public sphere and drives globalization in both the
developed and third world countries". 125 Ruggie's concept of the "global domain" where
civil society, business and states are the norm-creators is clearly a connected notion, albeit
perceived from a different ideological standpoint. Ruggie argues that "[a] global public
domain is emerging which cannot substitute for effective action by states but may help
pro duce it". 126 Shair's conception of governance is a stronger version of the same idea.
That Ruggie approximates Shamir's horizontal governance "market of authorities"
(where the TCC rule) is implicit in his closing observations:
[the very different dynamic at work now compared with the 1980s is that
business wants to help channel some of the pressures it faces into the onstruction
of at least minimally effective public sectors, including at the global level.127
What we have, then, is a "fundamental recalibration of the public-private sector
balance". 128 In other words, the contemporary analysts appear to agree in general terms on
the current configuration of the global order - which leaves us only the final question: what
is to be done?
Conclusion: market or revolution?
Finally, I now return to Rosa Luxemburg and this article's title, "Reform or revolution?", for
a conclusion on the regulation of the economy, through law Luxemburg's own position on
the issue is implied here:
No law obliges the proletariat to submit itself to the yoke of capitalism. Poverm,
the lack of means of production, obliges the proletariat to submit itself to the
yoke of capitalism. And no law in the world can give to the proletariat the means
of production while it remains in the framework of bourgeois society, for not
laws but economic development have torn the means of production from the
producers' possession.' 2 9
Of course, for Rosa Luxemburg, to reform or revolt is not a matter of choice, as
revolution is inevitable:
The scientific basis of socialism rests, as is well known, on three principal results
of capitalist development. First, on the growing anarchy of capitalist economy,
leading inevitably to its ruin. Second, on the progressive socialisation of the
process of production, which creates the germs of the future social order. And
124 In addition, Polanyi sees the division of labour being a result of biological (e.g. sex) and geographical factors.
125 B S Chimni, "Prolegomena to a class approach to international law" (2010) 21 FTL 57, and the response to
this article, A Rasulo "Bringing class back into international law", 6 September 2008, available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1675447 (last accessed 9 May 2011).
126 Ruggie, "Taking embedded liberalism global", n. 81 above, p. 232.
127 Ibid. p. 252 (emphasis added).
128 Ibid. p. 253.
129 Luxemburg, "Reform or revolution", n. 3 above, p. 92.
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third, on the increased organisation and consciousness of the proletarian class,
which constitutes the active factor in the cominig revolution.I 0
"Market-embedded morality" and class law produced through global governance
contributes to "the growing anarchy of the economy" - and thus to capitalism's end. When
this moment arrives. Marxists enisage capitalism's replacement by a "dictatorship of the
proletariat" as a temporary phase before the state withers away and we achieve
communism.131 'The idea is that lax too, will wither away, leaving just such "technical
regulation" as is necessary for the practical, logistical organisation of society. Such
regulation differs from law in its "unity of purpose", as opposed to law, which is based on
disunity of purpose or contestation.132 Production and distribution will be organised, not
on the basis of "equal/rights", but on the basis of "from each according to his abilit, to each
according to his needs!" 1 33
Polanyi emphasises that we need control and legal regulation to ensure, in particular,
"freedom"*j.3 Communist society envisages emancipation from law: instead of "legal
emancipation" - which is the abstract equality enjoy ed by the citizen as legal subject: "human
emancipation" we achieve:
[o]nly when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen,
and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life,
in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has
recognised and organised his '"forces ropres" as social forces, and consequently no
longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only
then will human emancipation have been accomplished. 1 3
Besides "rights", "justice" is another concept which in Marxism is associated with
liberalism.I 6 Neither are part of the vision, encapsulated in Aristotle's adage, "Where
people are in Friendship justice is not required."1 3
With the aid of the concept of "market-embedded morality", Shamir has shown us, that
the dichotomy between liberal capitalism and embedded liberalism is a false one. Combined
with Pashukanis' commodity form theory of law, we can conclude that taming the market
through legal regulation is a structural impossibility. This being the case, Rosa Luxemburg's
equation of the question of "Reform or revolution?" with "To be or not to be?" 13 8 is once
again salient.
130 F.g. Marx and Engels, Manfesto, n. 36 above, p. 60; Luxemburg, "Reform or revolution", n. 3 above, p. 45. On
this, in general and on the failure of this process in the example of the Soviet Union, see Sharlet al.,
"Introduction" in Seleted rii On Soie a A M S n. 50 above, especially pp. xii-xx.
131 See, generally, e.g. \I Lenn, Th St and Rtion (New York: International Publishers 1932); see also,
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